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Abstract. A recurring theme in the science-fiction series Black Mirror
is the consequence for society of an over-focus on social networking. The
episode Nosedive imagines a future in which every public interaction a
person has is rated by the other parties, and every aspect of ones life
depends on the overall rating computed from these. In this paper, we
show how such a scenario is already technically possible using existing
technologies such as distributed ledgers, and discuss means by which the
negative possibilities may be ameliorated using semantic approaches.
1 Introduction
The television drama Black Mirror [4] focuses, in each standalone episode, on
the potential personal and social consequences of the use of technology, basing its
plots on forms of technology which can be imagined as at least partially plausible
extensions of what is available or in use today. The societies depicted are usually
in some sense dystopian, although not always (San Junipero [5] being a notable
counterexample). A recurring theme across a number of episodes is the idea of
an over-focus on social networking.
The episode Nosedive [8] depicts a world in which every public interaction
with another person can be rated, between zero and five stars, by means of a
smartphone – after any interaction, pointing the phone’s camera at the person
one wishes to rate brings up a picture of that person and an interface to rate
them. Ratings can also be given for social media posts. Ratings are aggregated for
each person, so that it is also possible for anyone to view someone’s aggregate
rating, again, by holding up their phone or looking at an online profile. The
ubiquity of ratings has developed huge social importance, with employment,
personal and social consequences – a person might qualify, or not, to rent a
home, or get a job, or enter a social venue based on their rating. The society
shown is one of constant e↵ort to maintain or improve ones rating, and the
plot of the episode follows how one woman’s attempts to significantly improve
her own rating go wrong, and through a series of unfortunate events, backfire,
leading to her rating nosediving from just over four to nearly zero over a short
period of time.
We first show that the scenario of Nosedive can already be implemented using
technologies available now, before discussing possible technical approaches which
could minimise the negative social consequences of a hypothetical ubiquitous
adoption of such a rating system.
2 Distributed Ledgers
An emerging area of research in the Web concerns the use of distributed ledgers,
based on the blockchain data structure, to serve as immutable trustworthy record
stores in environments where trust is lacking. Originally developed to underpin
the Bitcoin cryptocurrency [12], blockchains are being experimented with for
a number of use cases, including verifiable educational certification [9, 14, 17],
data integrity and access [1, 18] and Internet-of-Things applications [6, 19]. The
design of a blockchain is such that the integrity of its contents are guaranteed by
a large network of financially and organisationally independent nodes, and the
cost of editing a record is prohibitively high, meaning that once entered onto a
blockchain, a record is e↵ectively immutable and irrefutable.
A distributed ledger is based on a blockchain: a timestamped sequential series
of records shared in toto across a network of nodes. There is no central or
authoritative node, and every node has the potential to add new records to the
ledger. New records are added by consensus: anyone who wishes to add data to
a node submits a cryptographically-signed request to do so. Each node competes
for the right to add (“mine”) a new block of transactions to the blockchain, with
that right awarded by consensus among all the nodes. The precise method of
consensus varies between di↵erent types of blockchain. The important feature of
any consensus mechanism is that there should be a cost involved in attempting to
mine blocks, and a reward for the successful node, to encourage good behaviour
among nodes. The winning node selects a set of pending record transactions and
groups them into a block, which is added to the chain. Requiring a consensus
between a large network of (financially, and organisationally) unrelated nodes
in order to add any data to the chain guarantees that spurious data cannot be
inserted by a malicious agent, and, due to the fact that modifying an older record
requires the entire chain following the modified record be rewritten as if from
scratch, the records entered in a blockchain are e↵ectively immutable.
Distributed ledger platforms such as Ethereum [20] add the ability to have
executable code embedded in a blockchain, in so-called “smart contracts”. Be-
cause the code of a smart contract is stored on the blockchain like any other
record, it is immutable and traceable to the account of the person who deployed
it to the platform. This means that smart contracts can be relied on as not hav-
ing been tampered with. If the source code of a contract is also made available,
it is possible to verify that the deployed version is genuinely created from the
given source. An open source smart contract, then, can be trusted as a genuine
implementation of what its source code describes, which allows everyone who
interacts with the contract to verify that it behaves in the way that is expected
of it. Smart contracts are therefore usable to mediate transactions between users
on a distributed ledger platform in a trustworthy way.
Records on a distributed ledger are public, and, as stated earlier, all nodes
on the network have a complete copy of the entire chain. This does not mean,
however, that everything must be readable by everyone; records can contain en-
crypted data, and, with a suitable cryptographic key management infrastructure,
the data owner can implement a “selective visibility” system, only permitting
chosen others to view the full or partial contents of a record.
3 Implementing the Nosedive rating system
We see two main technical requirements to implement the Nosedive rating sys-
tem. To simplify the discussion, let us say that person A wishes to give person
B a rating of n stars, where n is a natural number between 0 and 5 in relation to
a face-to-face interaction I between A and B. Person C, at a later date, wants
to view this rating’s value.
1. the ability for A’s mobile device to recognise B’s proximity and provide A
with the ability to select B’s name and apply the rating.
2. Ratings must be unforgeable and incapable of being tampered with, and
always attributable to both A and B in their respective roles in the rating
transaction.
In the episode, A simply needs to hold her device up facing B rather than
making a selection on the screen to achieve 1; potentially we can imagine ad-
vanced facial recognition in addition to the other techniques described here en-
abling this. And 2 is never explicitly stated; however, we must assume that it
applies in order for the system to carry the weight in people’s lives that it is
shown to do.
To implement 1, it is possible to take advantage of the widespread availability
of accurate GPS devices in modern smartphones. If each phone registered its
current location in a public database, it would be possible for A’s phone to use
its own location to query for nearby phones, and then, from the returned list
of devices, query each in turn, via some presumably standardised interface, for
a user profile, containing, e.g., B’s name, picture, cryptographic public key and
“rating account” details. To ensure as best as possible that ratings of B were tied
to B’s actual behaviour (and not, for example, the behaviour of someone who has
stolen B’s phone), it may be necessary to require some biometric identification
of B. For non-proximate ratings, profiles can be shared via social media.
2 can be developed using a distributed ledger with smart contracts. If A
and B both have accounts on a distributed ledger, publicised via their user
profiles, then it would easily be possible for A to submit a numerical rating to
B’s “rating” smart contract via a cryptographically-signed request. If C reads
B’s profile, then he can query B’s rating contract to view the rating n. A suitable
public key infrastructure would support trustworthy attribution of the rating to
A and prevent forgery, and the properties of the distributed ledger would ensure
that ratings could not be tampered with once made – collectively making the
ratings e↵ectively irrefutable. In fact, we are currently experimenting with the
scenario of distributed-ledger-based reputation transactions ([9]) using the idea
of “reputation tokens” to be used in education as a means of recognising and
accrediting soft skills that traditionally are not adequately covered by traditional
assessment and accreditation.
Signed and immutably timestamped records on the ledger would provide,
therefore, an e↵ectively irrefutable record of all rated interactions in a person’s
history with the system. While it would be possible, and perhaps simpler in some
ways, to implement a system using a centralised database without a ledger, one
could not then be certain that ratings could not be tampered with by those with
access to the database.
The technologies required are already developed and in use, and it would not
be technically di cult to build the Nosedive system using them.
4 Potential for abuse
It should be noted at the outset that there are already currently-obtaining situa-
tions in which people voluntarily take part in systems in which they are rated by
other users, either explicitly or implicitly. Every user of the auction site eBay [7],
for example, has a rating determined by other users reflecting their status as a
“good citizen” of the site. Forum/discussion sites which implement a “Like” but-
ton on contributions can show the total number of “likes” a user has received on
the site. (The tabletop games community site Boardgamegeek [3], for example,
does this with “thumbs”, its “like” system.) In a somewhat more sophisticated
way, online dating sites provide rankings of users, although these rankings are
context-sensitive and depend on the user viewing them, in terms of how well
users match the viewers. The algorithms computing the rankings are generally
proprietary; it seems reasonable to assume that they are in some way learned
from similar users.
The bulk of existing research into online rating systems has focused on on-
line sales systems or discussion forums such as these. Desiderata for an online
reputation system are suggested in [21], and include mechanisms to prevent or
discourage users from changing their identities to “discard” a bad rating, and
to limit the e↵ect of “memory” in ratings - to prevent historical low ratings
from dragging an average down even when a person’s current ratings are consis-
tently high. One of the desiderata is also that ratings from high-ranking users be
weighted more than those of low-ranking ones – an idea which we discuss below
in section 5.1.
It is clear, however, that the disastrous outcome for the protagonist in Nose-
dive is not far-fetched; a system for ubiquitous ratings of people, for any reason,
and with profound social consequences, is ripe for abuse. We envisage this abuse
in the form of malicious, trivial or thoughtless low ratings directly, as shown
in the episode, as well as in over-interpretation of low ratings in inappropriate
contexts. In existing ranking systems, [16] showed that negative rankings have
a disproportionate e↵ect on reputation compared to positive rankings. While it
may well be appropriate to refuse to buy from an eBay seller with a low rating,
it is clearly not appropriate to refuse to hire someone on the basis of, for ex-
ample, their social life. Even supposing that one accepted the concept of rating
each public interaction according to perceived merit, there is no a priori reason
to believe that “fair” ratings are achievable. People have been shown to assess
in others in a discriminatory manner based on existing prejudices in otherwise
identical circumstances (see, e.g., [13]). We may therefore reasonably expect that
groups disadvantaged on the basis of gender, ethnic origin, sexuality, and so on,
would become disadvantaged in terms of ratings. Indeed, in Nosedive, those who
are shown to be experience the most significant consequences as a result of low
ratings are members of existing disadvantaged groups, by gender or race.. The
protagonist’s brother, however (white, male and hinted to be heterosexual) is
shown to be less invested in the need for a high rating, and it seems plausible
that ones investment in ratings in general would vary in inverse proportion to
societal privilege.
5 Minimising the e↵ects of a Nosedive rating system
Let us suppose that some social or economic pressure leads to the widespread
adoption of such a technology. In itself this appears to be unlikely, for reasons
including the scenario which is the central plot of Nosedive, but for the sake of
argument, let us assume that it takes place. And let us assume that such a system
could be enforced, perhaps by economic pressures, to be close to universal, so
that everyone had access to the relevant hardware and software to take part,
and the options for “opting out” were limited to non-existent. (In practice, we
assume that none of these are achievable, particularly the latter two, and that
such a system has so many manifest and serious ethical and social problems with
it that widespread adoption would be resisted very very strongly, su ciently to
undermine its implementation at all.) But if it did, what measures could be put
in place to protect users from malicious or punitive ratings?
5.1 Automatic or manual moderation
The most obvious, and on the surface, likely to be e↵ective, approach would be if
B had the power to accept or reject ratings at will, but of course, to do so would
undermine the concept of a rating and would lead to the vast majority of, if not
all, people having only the maximum rating. Even a slight modification, in which
ratings are accepted or rejected, but the recipient does not know the value of the
rating at the time of acceptance, would still tend to lead to overall high average
ratings, as people would generally choose to accept ratings for interactions which
they felt had gone well.
Take into account the rating of the rater Low-rated people’s ratings do
not count as much as those of high-rated people, i.e., A’s ratings are weighted
by her own rating.
This approach might seem good on paper, but is likely to be harmful in
practice. Given the hypothesis that the distribution of high and low ratings
would come to reflect existing power structures in society, there is the potential
for this approach simply to end up entrenching disadvantage. An episode of the
sitcom Community [2] with a similar theme to Nosedive envisaged this precise
scenario, with the outcome being a very highly stratified society with little social
movement.
Take into account the rating history of raters. The ratings of someone
who frequently rates people low are weighted less than the ratings of others.
This is also subject to being gamed. All a malicious person needs to do is to
give high ratings to interactions which are not important to them in order to
maintain rating influence on those who do. It also would only a↵ect persistently
low-rating people, and would have no e↵ect on the situation where B receives
many low ratings from a large number of otherwise typically-rating people. (This
may well have been the case at a number of points in the episode, such as when
the protagonist receives a lot of low ratings because she’s standing on the highway
in tra c, or when she takes over the microphone at the wedding.)
This would also be relevant to other forms of gaming of the rating system. For
example, family and friend groups might cooperate to increase their members’
ratings, while antagonistic social groups could do the opposite. Analysis of rating
history could identify patterns such as this, and allow for normalisation of ratings
to reflect them.
Require mutual ratings If only A rates B in relation to I, nothing happens
to B’s rating until and unless B also rates A in relation to I.
This would provide B with some control and the ability to avoid ratings
which are predicted to be bad. However, bearing in mind we are discussing a
hypothetical situation where society as a whole has decided to adopt ubiquitous
rating, it seems less than likely that this level of control would be accepted.
Mutual agreement would be one of the mechanisms by which erroneous rat-
ings could be corrected (for example, in the case of misidentification of a person).
Meta-rating Nearby people are randomly selected to “rate a rating”, with
low-ranked ratings being withdrawn or reversed.
This approach has the potential to make a di↵erence, and has been imple-
mented with positive e↵ects in discussion systems – a notable example being the
Slashdot technology news site [15], where every contribution in a discussion can
be rated by other users, and whose “metamoderation” system has been shown
to succeed in maintaining civility in discussions [10]. This method could also be
used to address erroneous ratings.
Potential di culties with this method are the overhead of “meta-rating” –
would people be willing to expend the extra e↵ort to do it? – and the observation
that meta-ratings are just as likely to be a↵ected by conscious and unconscious
bias as the ratings themselves.
Apply a cost to giving ratings If there were a cost to rating someone, or a
limit on the number of ratings which could be given (within a particular time
period, for example), then it may serve to deter frivolous ratings. If the cost were
financial, of course, this would again serve to entrench existing status. If simply
a limit in the number of ratings, there is a chance that malicious ratings would
be less likely.
5.2 Semantic approaches
Contextual ratings Rather than a semantics-free number, ratings are instead
applied to a particular category of interaction or behaviour, e.g., “this rating is
for a customer in a retail purchasing interaction”. [11] argues that ratings should
always be interpreted relative to their original context.
This allows fine-grained information to be conveyed. Specifically, it allows
for more subtle interpretation of ratings. So in hiring someone, an employer
will not (indeed, should not) be concerned with what that person is like as a
wedding guest, and can therefore exclude all ratings related to irrelevant trans-
actions. More specifically, an aggregate rating could be computed not across all
interactions, but across all interactions of specified types, such as all financial
interactions. With more sophisticated interfaces and possibly smarter systems,
the context could be extended to support the notion of evidence for a rating to
be recorded alongside the rating itself.
For contextual ratings to function, there would need to be an ontology of
human interaction describing the categorical relationships between interaction
types (such as that a retail transaction is a financial interaction, for example).
Manual modelling, however, is only likely to get so far, given the range and
complexity of human interactions which take place. Fine-grained categorisations
could be crowdsourced, with, perhaps, some central editorial approval or mod-
eration process to avoid discriminatory or o↵ensive categories.
Reasoning could be carried out on semantic representations to derive new
categories or specialised ratings – this has potential for positive or negative con-
sequences. For example, it might then be possible for malicious users to simulate
discriminatory categories indirectly by deriving them. Positive possibilities in-
clude, among others, the ability to identify patterns in ratings received, which
might help to limit or avoid negative e↵ects. (The same approach would apply if
it were also possible to find out the ratings that someone had given too, which
would improve transparency in the process regardless.)
Purely semantic ratings The idea of contextual ratings could be taken one step
further, and the idea of numerical ratings could be dropped entirely. So instead
of “B is rated 4”, or “B is rated 4 in relation to I, which is a retail interaction”,
it would be “B is rated “helpful” in relation to I, which is a retail interaction”.
Models would need to be developed for relevant attributes, such as “helpful”
which could be associated with particular interactions, or interaction types, and
with su cient ontological semantics, reasoning could be carried out as with
numbers. Such contextual semantic ratings would be more fine-grained still, and
o↵er more flexibility, while perhaps helping people to avoid the habit of over-
interpreting numbers. Aggregation too need not be purely numerical; aggregate
categories using vague qualifiers, such as “mostly harmless”, could be computed.
Selective visibility of ratings It could even be possible, using smart con-
tracts, to enforce restrictions on ratings that are taken into account; if C has
to specify up-front the reason for reading B’s rating, with B’s acceptance of
the reason, there could be hardcoded, crowdsourced, or legally mandated sets of
interaction types which may be considered in computing the rating. Potentially
the user could have the ability to override the request and add further limits
onto the considered interaction types. However, this latter ability seems likely to
be subject to the same social pressures as requiring approval or mutual rating
before a new rating has e↵ect.
Two-way personalisation Combining semantic representation of contextual
rating data with selective visibility gives the potential for all parties, A, B and
C, to provide semantic descriptions of preferences and inputs which can be used
for fine-grained negotiation of requests and permissions when it comes to rating,
being rated and viewing other ratings, from which one would expect good prac-
tices to emerge from privacy-conscious users which could be adopted by those
less skilled when it comes to technology and privacy protections.
6 Conclusions
We have described how a ubiquitous personal rating system, as shown in the
Black Mirror episode Nosedive, could be implemented using technologies avail-
able today, backed up by smart-contract-enabled distributed ledger platforms
which ensure the availability of e↵ectively immutable histories of e↵ectively ir-
refutable records of ratings. We have speculatively discussed potential moder-
ation techniques and Semantic Web technologies which might aim to limit the
negative consequences of such a system.
None of the speculated measures do more than mitigate the possibilities of
abuse, and it is hard to see how anything other than avoiding the system at all
could prevent it entirely. Currently-used personal rating systems are limited to
very specific contexts, such as eBay, with no consequences beyond those contexts,
but a ubiquitous system is inevitably subject to many forms of abuse.
While we believe it is highly unlikely that society as a whole would adopt
a Nosedive system, there have of course been historical and recent instances of
societies choosing options not in the best interest of the majority of its members.
Expecting a technological solution to scenarios such as this is na¨ıve; technology
can be designed to support safe choices or minimise dangerous ones, but ulti-
mately, it can rarely, if ever, enforce them. if there were a significant danger
that Nosedive-style ratings were to become a ubiquitous phenomenon, the most
e↵ective approach would likely be to tackle the economic and social pressures
leading to this danger.
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